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Energy Efficiency Policy: Surveying the Puzzles  
Timothy J. Brennan 
Abstract 
Promoting energy efficiency (EE) has become a leading policy response to greenhouse gas 
emissions, energy dependence, and the cost of new generators and transmission lines. Such policies 
present numerous puzzles. Electricity prices below marginal production costs could warrant EE policies if 
EE and energy are substitutes, but they will not be substitutes if the energy price is sufficiently high. 
Using EE savings to meet renewable energy requirements can dramatically increase the marginal cost of 
electricity. Rejecting ―rationality‖ of consumer energy choices raises doubts regarding cost–benefit 
analysis when demand curves may not reveal willingness to pay. Decoupling to guarantee constant profit 
regardless of use contradicts findings that incentive-based mechanisms outperform cost-of-service 
regulation. Regulators may implement EE policies to exercise buyer-side market power against 
generators, increasing consumer welfare but reducing overall economic performance. Encouraging 
utilities to take over potentially competitive EE contradicts policies to separate competitive from 
monopoly enterprises.  
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Energy Efficiency Policy: Surveying the Puzzles  
Timothy J. Brennan 
Introduction 
Energy efficiency (EE) is among the most intensely discussed and widely implemented 
targets in the realms of energy and environmental policy. It refers, in essence, to an output-to-
input ratio—getting the same level of service or, more contentiously, an equivalent quality-
adjusted level of service, from a smaller quantity of energy consumed. Examples include getting 
the same heating from a high-efficiency furnace or the same cooling from an energy-efficient air 
conditioner or heater. Quality issues come into play in some cases, such as when one attempts to 
get the same level of automotive transportation using less gasoline or the same amount of light 
from a compact fluorescent light bulb (CFL).  
 EE is not coincident with economic efficiency. That distinction follows from its nature 
as a physical measure independent of any comparison of the marginal benefit of increased effi-
ciency with its cost.  Nevertheless, the interest in EE is not divorced from economic considera-
tions. Across many energy uses, the scientific consensus is that the increased concentration of 
carbon dioxide from burning fossil fuels will lead to global warming and climate change, if it has 
not already done so (Min et al. 2011). If the effects of carbon burning are unpriced, subsidizing 
EE could be justified as a second-best response, but only if EE and energy use are substitutes, 
which as we will see is generally not the case if energy prices are sufficiently high. With regard 
to oil, used almost exclusively for transportation and heating in the United States, many see reli-
ance on imports constitutes a threat to national security that may result in network externalities 
that EE policies could mitigate (Parry et al. 2007).  
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With regard to electricity, the greenhouse effect concerns and ―not in my back yard‖ 
(NIMBY) attitudes toward new generation and transmission construction suggest negative exter-
nalities associated with energy use that promoting more energy-efficient lighting and appliances 
could mitigate. In addition, the costs of generating electricity can vary enormously over the year. 
Because electricity cannot be stored, the capacity to provide power during the relatively few (less 
than 1 percent) peak demand hours of the year must be in place for the entire year, making cost 
during those critical peak hours as much as 50–100 times baseload prices. Absent meters and 
monitoring technologies to facilitate the real-time pricing of electricity, time-averaged pricing 
will lead to excessive use during these peak hours and too little use off-peak (Brennan 2004), 
leading to expensive new capacity and exacerbating the NIMBY effect.  
 As this suggests, EE plays a significant role in policies regarding the electricity infra-
structure. Electricity is particularly inviting as a target, not only because a substantial fraction of 
energy use goes toward electricity generation, but because the wire infrastructure—local distri-
bution and long-distance transmission—continues to be regulated even as much of the wholesale 
generation, and to a lesser extent, the retail sale of electricity, has been opened to competition. 
As we will see, the existence of a structure for setting the prices and terms of electricity delivery 
plays a particular role in providing a convenient institutional venue through which to design and 
implement EE policies.1 
Such EE policies can affect the electricity infrastructure in a number of ways. An obvious 
effect would be to reduce the demand for new generation and transmission capacity. As we will 
see below, this effect could result in EE being employed by regulators to monopsonize the sup-
ply of electricity. A second effect, not directly considered here, is that EE could complement 
―smart grid‖ construction, essentially adding communications capability to the distribution and 
transmission grids. Among other things, a smart grid could facilitate the ability of entrepreneurs 
to offer energy management systems along with electricity itself. Such firms could offer lighting, 
heating, and cooling at reduced costs, allowing consumers to benefit from higher efficiency 
without having to figure out whether the long-term benefits from reduced energy expenditures 
are worth the short-term costs of investments in EE technologies. A third EE effect could be to 
encourage the use of ―smart meters‖ to promote more efficient electricity use through real-time 
                                                 
1 Of course, focusing only on electricity could distort choices where there is potential to substitute between 
electricity and other energy sources with adverse environmental effects, such as increasing the demand for oil heat 
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pricing, although as we will see, EE policies plus real-time pricing could increase electricity use 
over what might occur with real-time pricing alone.  
An important institutional manifestation of these policies is that incumbent utilities, 
which have been devoted to supplying electricity—in some cases for a century or more—are 
charged with the primary responsibility for implementing EE policies that reduce demand for 
their products. One result of this is the adoption of decoupling policies, under which the revenues 
and profits of utilities are set to be independent of how much electricity they deliver. This runs 
counter to learning in regulatory economics, which has identified numerous flaws of fixed-profit 
regulation, and presents yet another puzzle regarding EE policies.  
A more fundamental problem is that, because the supply of EE appears to be quite com-
petitive, regulatory economics suggests that efforts in that area should not be relegated to incum-
bent monopoly utilities. Prevailing opinion holds otherwise, as exemplified by the views of some 
in the President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board that utilities should be ―engines of eco-
nomic recovery‖ by spearheading EE technologies (President’s Economic Recovery Advisory 
Board 2009). I explain how the choice to run EE programs through utilities is likely driven by 
political incentives rather than economic efficiency.  
Using Maryland as an example, EE programs span a wide spectrum. At the most general, 
the legislature, following the lead of the governor, has adopted an ―EmPower Maryland‖ pro-
gram that promises a 15 percent reduction in electricity use by 2015, divided between utility pro-
grams and those undertaken by the Maryland Energy Administration (MEA), part of the state’s 
executive branch (MEA 2008). The specific programs include subsidies, managed by the utili-
ties, to promote the substitution of new, high-efficiency air conditioners, home appliances, and 
lighting for older, less-efficient units. Both the sticks of building code changes and the carrots of 
financial and marketing assistance, low-interest loans, and subsidized energy audits would in-
crease EE in new homes and the retrofitting of existing buildings. Particular attention would be 
given to education and subsidized loans for consumers and small commercial enterprises, which 
many believe lack the expertise or access to capital to adopt EE programs that would be benefi-
cial to them, leaving aside social benefits from mitigating negative externalities (Gillingham et 
al. 2009). Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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This review points to a number of aspects of EE policy that provide reasons to question 
some of the presumptions implicit in these policies. I survey half a dozen of these aspects here.2 
First, I examine whether energy use and EE are in fact substitutes. Although the possibility of a 
rebound effect, where EE increases energy use, has been familiar for decades, perhaps less well 
known is that, under very general conditions, the rebound effect must exist for sufficiently high 
energy prices. Next, I briefly examine how EE could exacerbate the costs of companion policies, 
particularly renewable use requirements. Absent either a moving baseline or a reliance on hypo-
thetical rather than actual energy savings, allowing EE-based use reductions to satisfy a require-
ment that a given percentage of energy has to come from renewable sources can multiply the 
marginal cost of such a rule.  
A third aspect of EE policy brings in currently prominent methodological controversies. 
Although EE policies could be justified if energy prices are too low as a result of unpriced exter-
nalities or time-averaged pricing, some advocates also believe that energy prices, specifically 
those of electricity, are too high. Justifying EE in these circumstances requires systematic con-
sumer failure to invest in EE, even when the benefits from future reduced energy payments ex-
ceed the up-front cost. Among the policy puzzles presented by these mistakes is how one evalu-
ates EE programs, or any other program, when demand curves do not reflect the underlying ―re-
al‖ willingness to pay. One potential policy implication is a form of decoupling that guarantees 
distribution utilities the same revenues and profits regardless of the amount of electricity used. 
As this runs counter to theoretical results regarding the inefficiency of profit guarantees, decou-
pling policies implicitly ask if those analyses missed something. Although utilities may fail to 
provide information that would lead to demand reductions when revenues are tied to use, the 
conditions for such failure are sufficiently implausible, suggesting that the ultimate rationale is 
political rather than economic. 
Political economy considerations lead to the final two EE policy puzzles surveyed here. 
In light of the emphasis in the policy discussion on cutting electricity costs—which admittedly is 
contrary to goals to induce conservation—another interpretation of the view that EE could re-
duce spending on electricity is that it could be a tactic a regulator could use to exercise monop-
sony power against generators on behalf of its constituents. The debate in antitrust between 
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whether total welfare or consumer welfare should guide merger evaluation may be in the wrong 
venue; this distinction may play a greater role in understanding what utility regulators do.  
Finally, I ask why regulators vest utilities with the responsibility for implementing EE 
policies. Not only is this a possible example of the fox being asked to guard the henhouse, it 
more significantly contradicts concerns, reflected in both theory and practice, that regulated mo-
nopolies (electricity distribution utilities) should be kept out of competitive sectors (EE equip-
ment and services). Such concerns led to the break-up of the (old) AT&T (American Telephone 
and Telegraph) in the 1980s, involving the divestiture of its regulated local telephone networks. 
More recently, that idea served as the basis for Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
rules to require a functional separation between the ownership of competing generation facilities 
and control over monopoly distribution networks. An apparent and likely rationale for involving 
utilities in EE is again political—doing so results in having EE programs funded by regulator-
approved electricity rate increases rather than by taxes that a legislature would have to enact.  
Is EE a Substitute for Energy? 
For many if not most of its advocates, the goal of EE policy is to reduce energy use. It 
would be tempting to model this as a reduction in the demand for energy itself. However, this 
turns out to be inconsistent with the definition of EE—that it allows one to obtain an equivalent 
level of service with less energy. Unless one gets a significant amount of service from using no 
energy at all,3 this implies that the gross surplus from a given amount of energy increases as EE 
investments increase. Such an increase is inconsistent with the demand curve falling; for some 
quantities of electricity, the reservation price has to increase.4 Moreover, if the marginal effect of 
EE on the reservation price falls at higher levels of energy use, the demand may be expected to 
pivot. The effect of EE on the demand for energy has to resemble the diagram on the right in 
Figure 1 instead of the one on the left (P is price, Q is quantity). 
                                                 
3 I owe this qualification to Mike Waterson. 
4 See Appendix A. Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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If prices are low, EE and energy use are substitutes in that increasing the former (by re-
ducing its price) reduces demand for the latter. But because the demand curve for energy pivots 
with more EE, increasing EE will increase energy use if the price is sufficiently high. The re-
bound effect is not just possible, it is inevitable, rendering EE and energy use complementary as 
displayed in Figure 2.  
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gy prices rather than a theoretically reasonable generalization, this result might remain a curiosi-
ty rather than an outcome with policy relevance. At prevailing prices, it is likely that EE and en-
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the contrary. However, one policy effect bears watching. As noted above, the costs of supplying 
electricity during the few critical peak demand hours of the year could be many multiples of av-
erage prices. Recent policy experiments in Maryland employed critical peak prices more than 10 
times the average rate (Faruqui et al. 2009). With price increases of that magnitude, the potential 
for prices to go above the pivot point ought not be dismissed out of hand. If real-time pricing 
were adopted, EE policies could increase energy use during critical peak periods over the amount 
that one would see without those policies. 
Should EE Savings Count Toward a Renewable Requirement? 
In response to climate change, a number of policies have been proposed to limit green-
house gas emissions, particularly emissions of carbon dioxide resulting from the burning of fossil 
fuels to provide transportation and electricity. Among the many policy responses that have been 
suggested—such as carbon taxes and cap-and-trade marketable carbon emissions permit pro-
grams—are renewable portfolio standards (RPS), which would require electricity suppliers to 
meet demand by generating a prescribed percentage of electricity from renewable energy 
sources.5 To mitigate the cost of complying with an RPS—and it is presumably costly if bind-
ing—the obligations are tradable, such that an electricity supplier that meets demand with a 
greater percentage of renewable energy than that required under the RPS can sell renewable en-
ergy credits to allow those for whom procuring renewable power is more expensive to meet the 
requirement.6 
To further mitigate the cost of an RPS, one might allow electricity suppliers to apply re-
ductions in energy use toward meeting an RPS. For example, a supplier facing a 20 percent RPS 
might need to procure only 15 percent of its energy from renewable sources if it reduces demand 
by 5 percent. Recent legislative proposals to address climate change would give electricity sup-
pliers some flexibility in using energy use reductions to meet an RPS (Lenard 2009, 58–59). Be-
                                                 
5 Whether ―renewable‖ is defined in these proposals so that it is either necessary or sufficient that net carbon 
emissions be zero for a fuel source to be designated renewable, or whether the definition includes assorted political 
influences, is ignored here. Recent proposals to impose ―clean energy standards‖ on electricity providers suggest a 
broad definition, including nuclear and hydroelectric power and giving some credit for less carbon-intensive natural 
gas generation. 
6 Legislative proposals also included an option to make payments rather than meet the requirement, essentially 
capping the price of renewable energy credits and allowing more nonrenewable energy than one would get under the 
RPS. Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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cause the goal of climate policy should be to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, doing so either 
by switching to non-emitting fuel sources or by reducing energy use altogether should be equiva-
lent. Allowing electricity suppliers to choose between EE and renewable sources allows them to 
reduce emissions using whichever method is less expensive. In effect, combining EE with an 
RPS is equivalent to marketable permits for using nonrenewable generation. 
The baseline against which energy savings are measured plays a crucial role in determin-
ing the costs of electricity. Relative to a fixed baseline, increasing electricity supply by one unit 
not only increases the renewable requirement by the nominal percentage, it also forces the sup-
plier to acquire an additional full unit of electricity from renewable sources to make up for the 
apparent decline in EE.7 Whether the former or the latter is closer to the appropriate tax one 
would have on fossil fuel-generated electricity under a Pigovian carbon tax is beyond the scope 
of this paper. But the two are undeniably different. The seemingly beneficial merging of EE with 
an RPS has a potentially large unintended consequence.  
One could avoid this consequence in two ways. One option would be to adjust the base-
line to reflect the demand conditions that lead suppliers to choose a given quantity of electricity 
in response to demand. If weather is unusually warm, leading to a greater demand for electricity 
for cooling, one could increase the baseline to reflect what demand would have been absent EE 
investments at the higher temperatures. Thus, the increase in electricity use would not necessari-
ly force the supplier to obtain an additional unit of electricity from renewable sources because 
the measured ―efficiency gains‖ have not fallen. How this calculation would be made is far from 
clear.8 An alternative would be to attribute specific hypothetical savings from EE investments 
and use those to meet the RPS.9 These would not be based on actual use, and thus the actual 
marginal cost of increased use would be just as if the renewable standard alone were in place.  
                                                 
7 See Appendix B. 
8 This is not the only instance in which baseline measurement ambiguities complicate electricity policy. To 
encourage consumers to adopt real-time pricing, some have proposed programs in which consumers are paid not to 
use electricity (Faruqui et al. 2009). Some utilities propose that the money to cover the cost of the programs should 
come from selling this demand response in electricity capacity markets, which are mandated by grid operators to 
ensure that electricity supply can be kept equal to demand in order to prevent blackouts. This requires a way to 
measure what consumers would have used absent the payments to reduce use to calculate the capacity equivalent of 
demand response.  
9 I owe this suggestion to Karen Palmer. Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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Whether these hypothetical savings reflect actual use reductions at the margin may prove 
difficult to determine. One reason is the rebound effect. A second reason has to do with whether 
a utility’s efforts caused a consumer to adopt EE or whether that consumer would have done so 
anyway because the benefits of the EE investment over time outweigh its up-front cost. For ex-
ample, the present value of the savings from reduced electricity use for lighting may exceed the 
extra expense of a CFL. How the potential for consumer error or inability to make this compari-
son affects EE policy is the topic of the next section.  
“Second Best” or Consumer Error—and if the Latter, How Do We Evaluate EE 
Policy? 
EE policy would not be necessary if energy prices, and electricity prices in particular, 
equaled the sum of all relevant marginal costs. For electricity, one set of missing costs are those 
reflecting environmental costs in the absence of carbon taxes, cap-and-trade systems, or other 
policies to internalize them. Time-averaged prices fail to reflect the high variance of costs over 
time because of the need to recover the costs of peaking units over a very small fraction of hours 
during the course of a year. Even if real-time pricing were available, it might not be adopted effi-
ciently because users do not take into account the effect that their use may have on the probabil-
ity of a blackout (Brennan 2004).  
If electricity prices may fail to reflect these costs and EE is a substitute for energy use 
and not a complement—that is, if energy prices are not already too high for the rebound effect to 
be dominant—too little EE is consumed. The ―theory of the second best‖ provides a rationale for 
policies to encourage greater adoption of EE. It would move the economy closer to the economi-
cally efficient mix of EE and energy use that one would see if electricity were priced correctly.10 
The pollution externality could justify general subsidies for EE, and the blackout externality and 
the inability to charge real-time prices would be relevant for policies targeting appliances primar-
ily at peak demand periods (e.g., air conditioners but not light bulbs). 
This all follows from the second-best result that if EE and energy use are substitutes, 
overall economic efficiency could be improved if EE were subsidized at the margin to correct for 
its underutilization resulting from underpriced energy. But what if the price is too high? In Mary-
land, the prevailing electricity policy sentiment is that people use too much electricity, but that it 
                                                 
10 Of course, if EE and energy use are complements, as they would be if energy prices were sufficiently high, one 
would want to tax EE. Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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is also too expensive.11 If electricity is overpriced, consumers presumably overinvest in EE, and 
it should be taxed or discouraged by policy, not the other way around. 
Reconciling policy to encourage EE and excessive energy pricing requires a belief that 
consumers fail to invest in EE even if it is in their own private interest to do so, without regard to 
environmental or reliability externalities. Questions regarding this failure go back more than 
three decades (Hausman 1979) and remain widely held in the policy community. A good indica-
tor is Figure 3, a widely circulated and cited graph from McKinsey depicting a supply curve for 
carbon abatement based on the costs of different methods for reducing carbon dioxide emissions. 
The interesting aspect is not the particulars of the graph but that a substantial portion of the 
methods on the left side of the graph lies below the horizontal axis. Those are known in the ener-
gy policy community as ―negative cost‖ abatement methods, as requiring them would leave the 
economy better off, apart from any environmental effects from carbon abatement. 
 
                                                 
11 Although some who believe this attempt to attribute it to a lack of competition following the opening of retail 
markets, I am aware of little concrete evidence in that regard. After the 2006 Maryland gubernatorial election, the 
victor asked the state regulatory agency to investigate 72 percent increases in retail rates following the lifting of 
multiyear post-deregulation price ceilings, and the agency found the increases justified. Moreover, although retail 
service in Maryland is nominally deregulated, with entrants free to enter and set prices as they choose, the vast 
majority of residential customers continue to purchase electricity from the incumbent distribution utilities, and their 
rates remain overseen, if not explicitly regulated, by the Maryland Public Utility Commission. Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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Source: Enkvist et al. 2007, 38. 
Standard economics would suggest that the negative cost portion of the supply curve re-
flects the cost of quality or performance shortcomings of some of those methods for reducing 
emissions, such as increased accident risk in more fuel-efficient cars or undesirable characteris-
tics of light from fluorescent bulbs. However, behavioral economics—based upon the premise 
that people fail to act in their own self-interest because of bounded rationality or cognitive limi-
tations—could be invoked. Gillingham et al. (2009) discuss behavioral economics rationales for 
EE policy but also note that there may be more conventional market failures in terms of a lack of 
information or an inability for homeowners to finance EE investments.  Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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The McKinsey graph illustrates the prominence that choice failure plays in the EE policy 
discussion.12 The primary policy puzzle in the EE context (and likely others) presented by the 
possibility of consumer choice failure involves evaluation. Generally, conventional cost–benefit 
methods require the willingness to pay revealed by demand curves to be the actual valuation 
consumers place on output. If such measures cannot be trusted, cost–benefit analyses require 
some measure of the ―right‖ valuations that must inherently be introduced into the analysis from 
outside.  
In a study of the standards instituted by California and used around the country for evalu-
ating EE and demand-side management programs (State of California 2002), I proposed judging 
the effects of subsidies that induce EE adoptions by using the post-adoption valuation of EE ben-
efits, not the allegedly mistaken pre-adoption standards (Brennan 2010a). If a marginal increase 
in EE adoption induces a non-marginal effect on consumer surplus because the subsidies allow 
consumers to overcome a putative cognitive limitation, EE policies can by that standard be bene-
ficial, even if energy prices were too high beforehand. If no consumers would adopt a particular 
set of EE technologies that would be in their self-interest, a utility could be induced to do it for 
them if it got the same revenues from overall electricity sales regardless of the amount sold. Such 
revenue assurance would leave it to the utility to maximize profits by minimizing the costs of 
either generating electricity or supplying the EE that would give consumers the same welfare 
with less electricity—often referred to as ―negawatts.‖  
Whether post-adoption welfare is the correct measure or appropriate for policy remains a 
puzzle, as does the validity of the assumption that consumers fail to act in their own self-
interest.13 The possibility that consumers may make correct choices plays a role in the degree to 
which EE-related energy savings should be credited to a utility’s efforts to promote it. Suppose, 
for example, that N households purchase subsidized CFLs. On the one hand, if consumers rou-
tinely make mistakes but one homeowner’s adoption of EE leads neighbors to adopt it as well 
and to buy nonsubsidized CFLs, then the number of adopters resulting from the program exceeds 
                                                 
12 A methodological assessment of consumer choice failure, on either empirical or theoretical grounds, is beyond the 
scope of this paper. A key theoretical concern I have with behavioral economics is whether it represents a premature 
admission of defeat regarding the ability of neoclassical economics to supply explanations for seemingly 
inexplicable, irrational, or mistaken phenomena.  
13 If consumers lack information or the ability to determine whether the benefits of a CFL over an incandescent bulb 
exceed its costs—a presumed inability that has led Congress to pass legislation preventing the sale of incandescent 
bulbs after 2014—one wonders what choices consumers can be thought to make competently. Resources for the Future  Brennan 
13 
N, resulting in what is called a ―net to gross‖ ratio exceeding one.14 On the other hand, if some 
consumers who purchased the CFLs with the subsidy would have done so without it, then the 
utility’s program would induce fewer than N new adopters and the net-to-gross ratio would be 
less than one. In other words, the imputed benefits from utility EE programs are less than they 
might appear. Consumers who would have made EE investments absent subsidies because they 
understand the net benefits or want to contribute to the environment are known in EE policy cir-
cles as free riders—a perverse use of a generally pejorative term used to describe those who are 
unwilling to act in the collective interest. 
Does Decoupling Help, and if so, How? 
To my knowledge, no one has implemented a policy to divorce overall electricity reve-
nues from the quantity sold. A less draconian version, known as decoupling, has been adopted in 
a number of states (MEA 2008, 4, 44–46; Pew Center on Global Climate Change 2011). Decou-
pling involves separating a distribution utility’s profits and revenues from use. It does not in-
clude charging for distribution through fixed fees for customers, which would be an efficient 
way to recover costs if costs were not based on the quantity of electricity delivered.15 Rather, if 
one customer reduces her use, the rates charged to all customers rise to keep distribution reve-
nues intact. Unlike other regulatory policy innovations—marketable permits, price caps, spec-
trum auctions—decoupling did not percolate in the academic literature for years prior to imple-
mentation. Interest in it arose as a mechanism to promote energy conservation and efficiency, 
particularly in light of the effects of energy use on climate. 
Decoupling’s advocates argue that, under conventional pricing of distribution through 
fixed fees per kilowatt-hour delivered, utilities would lose profits if EE programs reduced elec-
tricity sales.16 Decoupling would instead make utilities willing to participate in EE programs, 
participating in what many view as a national economic growth opportunity.17 Former President 
Bill Clinton and President Barack Obama’s representatives during the 2008 campaign have spo-
                                                 
14 For an example of the terminology here, see Summit Blue Consulting (2008, 10). 
15 If prices equal to the marginal cost of connecting an additional customer—the optimal fixed fee—do not generate 
sufficient revenues to cover costs, some usage-based prices would reduce the welfare cost of covering the regulated 
firm’s expenses relative to recovering all costs through fixed fees (Brennan 2010b). 
16 For more detail on positions for and against decoupling, see Brennan (2010b). 
17 I have heard this mentioned in discussions with the President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board. Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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ken in favor of decoupling. On the political economy side, decoupling shifts revenue-side risk 
from the utilities to consumers.18 
Decoupling has its opponents. It presents operational questions, such as when revenues 
and profits can be adjusted and whether it should be segregated by customer class (residential, 
commercial and industrial). Some high-volume industrial electricity users—many of whom have 
already adopted EE measures and thus stand to pay higher rates if EE becomes more widespread 
after decoupling—argue that making utilities’ revenues and profits independent of use will dis-
courage them from taking steps to increase their own operational efficiency and reduce their in-
centives to manage risks associated with variation in usage. Perhaps unexpected bedfellows with 
these large industrial users are state regulatory public advocates, who resist guaranteeing a utility 
its profits without a public right to intervene. A possibly unexpected and unintended side effect 
of decoupling is that divorcing utility profits from use attenuates incentives to restore service af-
ter storm-related outages.19  
From an economic standpoint, decoupling is of interest because it challenges the central 
findings of regulatory economics. Since Averch and Johnson’s (1962) article that founded the 
field nearly 50 years ago, economists have learned that fixed-profit regulation induces distortions 
in input use when the allowed rate of return exceeds the cost of capital. When the rate of return is 
correctly set equal to capital costs, the effects may be worse, as the regulated firm earns zero 
profits and lacks incentives to control costs.  
For nearly three decades, the recommended alternative has been to divorce prices from 
costs through price caps (Littlechild 1983). Such prices could be adjusted over time for inflation 
and future profits shared through preset downward price adjustments, but prices would not be 
adjusted as costs change. Price caps thus give regulated firms the same incentives to innovate 
and cut costs as those price-taking firms face in competitive markets. Over time, prices capped 
over a range of services would converge to a Ramsey-like point, maximizing welfare subject to 
the profits the firm earns (Brennan 1989).  
                                                 
18 This reduces distribution utilities’ overall profit risk unless revenues are highly correlated with costs, but because 
most distribution costs are fixed in the short run and independent of use per customer, this correlation does not 
appear likely to be significant. 
19 Although the cost of forgone usage under conventional cost recovery is significant, it may not be large relative to 
the cost of restorations. I owe this suggestion to Mark Case of Baltimore Gas and Electric, in response an op-ed I 
had in the Baltimore Sun noting the irony of suggestions from others that utilities face monetary penalties for slow 
post-outage restorations in a state that has adopted decoupling.  Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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Decoupling challenges this consensus by taking as a premise the value in guaranteeing a 
distribution utility’s profits. One response to this challenge is to see if the analyses supporting 
price cap regulation missed something. Two effects in particular may have been neglected. First, 
a price-capped utility would bias the information it provides, withholding that which would re-
duce demand (Brennan 2010b).20 Whether utilities have unique access to information relevant to 
demand choices—for example, on the savings potential from CFLs or the operating costs of 
high-efficiency air conditioners—seems doubtful. Moreover, if a utility has to sell electricity at a 
time-averaged rate during peak demand periods when wholesale costs exceed the retail price, it 
will have an incentive to promote technologies that reduce energy use even without decoupling.  
A second missed effect is that a price-capped utility would have incentives to subsidize 
only complements (substitutes) for electricity use when the price of electricity exceeds (is lower 
than) its marginal cost. This result is qualitatively consistent with the second-best responses to 
distorted energy prices, although the utility’s private incentives to respond in this way are less 
than the social incentives because the utility does not capture the full marginal surplus of elec-
tricity use (Brennan 2010b). In any event, to the extent electricity prices exceed marginal cost 
because of usage-based delivery charges, EE advocates would find that utilities would be unwill-
ing to subsidize EE investments that reduce use.  
Neither of these economic arguments seems especially compelling. Moreover, even if 
profits are guaranteed, a utility has no particular incentive to invest in EE.21 The weakness of the 
economic arguments suggests that the rationales for decoupling are not economic but political. 
Utilities are likely to be in a strong position to influence electricity policy (Stigler 1971). This is 
especially so as electricity policy falls within the jurisdictions of regulatory agencies rather than 
legislatures. State legislators may prefer to let the public service commission cover the cost of 
EE programs through electricity charges rather than face the political cost of enacting taxes to do 
so.22 Decoupling serves to defuse utility opposition to EE programs by keeping the utilities 
whole. This is not necessarily a bad thing; it should be possible, in principle, to implement poli-
cies that pass a cost–benefit test in a Pareto-improving fashion. But the economics of decoupling 
                                                 
20 See Appendix C. 
21 If a decoupled utility does support EE, the effect on demand will be greater than the direct marginal effect 
because reducing demand will also raise price, in order to keep the utility’s revenues constant. See Appendix D. I 
thank Ayoo Collins for suggesting this effect. 
22 Shifting the costs to the regulator to pass them in turn to the utility is also consistent with blaming the utility 
rather than the consumer for energy consumption deemed excessive. Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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strongly suggest that it is motivated by incentives in the political arena rather than the economics 
of supplying electricity or EE. 
Could EE Be a Monopsony Tactic? 
Much of the rhetoric regarding EE involves avoiding electricity purchases. Some of this 
extends to holding down electricity prices. To some degree, this is a reasonable way to character-
ize policies that would reduce electricity use at peak periods (e.g., through real-time pricing and 
demand management) to avoid having to construct generation and transmission capacity that 
would be used only a few hours out of the year. However, in this context and others, holding 
down electricity prices bears a strong resemblance to exercising monopsony power over genera-
tors. 
If a regulator had the incentive and downstream market share necessary to be able to ex-
ercise market power against upstream generators, it would face a problem in implementation. 
Demand at the monopsony price would exceed demand at the competitive price and thus the 
quantity supplied under monopsony. This requires rationing. If rationing does not result in elec-
tricity being allocated to its highest-valued uses, monopsony may reduce consumer welfare ra-
ther than enhancing it, as intended.23 A draconian example of this reverse effect, in which ration-
ing is where each unit goes to a buyer willing to pay at least the monopsony price with equal 
probability, is illustrated in Figure 4, from Brennan (2011). 
                                                 
23 Of course, monospony reduces total economic welfare. We return to the distinction between consumer and total 
welfare below. Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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Source: Brennan 2011. 
EE can complement monopsony because it can allow the regulator to solve the rationing 
problem by subsidizing EE investments that reduce demand. Specifically, the derivative of con-
sumer welfare with respect to price is negative at the competitive price (consumer welfare rises 
as price falls) even if consumers bear the full cost of the subsidy of EE costs necessary to in-
crease EE penetration to reduce demand and eliminate rationing (Brennan 2011). A regulator 
would find it optimal to subsidize EE to some extent to reduce demand and thus price by moving 
supply down the supply curve.24  
Establishing that a regulator could subsidize EE to exercise monopsony power does not 
mean that it would do so. The capture theory of regulation noted above suggests that the genera-
tion sector may well have more political influence on the regulator’s actions than does the dis-
persed consumer interest. Second, if it could do so, a regulator could make consumers better off 
if it maximized aggregate surplus at the competitive level and extracted profits from the supply-
ing generators through lump-sum charges or price discrimination. Even if a regulator were in-
clined to monopsonize, it would have to have buyer-side market power over a set of generators 
                                                 
24 See Appendix E. The result holds in general only if the costs to consumers of the EE subsidy are borne in a lump-
sum fashion. Distortions in other markets resulting from the need to increase taxes to raise revenues to cover the 
subsidy cost could make monopsony unprofitable because of rationing even at the margin at the competitive price. Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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in a wholesale market. As these markets span large geographic areas because of the spans and 
capacities of the transmission networks that support them, an individual state regulator seems 
unlikely to have monopsony power except in a few large states.25  
There are other limitations as well. The supply curve for electricity is widely recognized 
to be highly upward sloping once baseload capacity is exhausted—the ―hockey stick‖ metaphor 
is widely used. The relevant marginal cost represented by the load is long-run, however, in which 
prices cover the cost of the capital used to supply electricity during a limited number of peak 
demand hours. Regulatory efforts to drive down the cost of electricity by reducing purchases 
would, at least in the short run, come about largely through opportunistically denying generators 
their expected ability to recover capital costs. Because of the potential for regulatory opportun-
ism, quasi-constitutional legal rules require regulators to grant firms under their jurisdictions a 
―just and reasonable‖ return, essentially to preclude a taking of the firms’ capital. Although the 
generators are not directly regulated in an open wholesale market, it may be an open legal ques-
tion whether a regulator with the ability and inclination to monopsonize could do so. 
The policy puzzle presented by EE here is not so much the legal question as it is the eco-
nomic question of what welfare standards are controlling. Debates regarding the degree of anti-
trust enforcement revolve in part around whether profits a firm or firms gain through a practice 
should count in the calculation of whether a practice should be permitted, or whether they should 
be neglected. This is generally referred to as the ―total welfare vs. consumer welfare‖ debate. It 
goes back at least to Williamson’s (1968) suggestion that the savings from a relatively small re-
duction in costs post-merger would outweigh the deadweight loss from higher prices. Cost sav-
ings would be reaped on all of the output of the merging firms, whereas the deadweight loss re-
sults only from the output forgone from the higher post-merger prices. Despite the intensity of 
the discussion over the last four decades, the number of antitrust cases in which a total welfare 
analysis would have given a result different from that of a consumer welfare analysis seems 
slim.26 The rhetoric and potential for EE to drive down wholesale electricity prices suggests that 
                                                 
25 One exception may be that during peak demand periods, transmission grid congestion can create load pockets that 
may lie within a state and thus present at least a theoretical potential for monopsony power. FERC is currently 
reviewing claims that state policies in New England to encourage new generation policies are allowing the exercise 
of buyer market power in capacity markets. New England Power Generators Association v. ISO New England et al., 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Docket EL 10-50 (March 24, 2010).  
26 Price discrimination can increase total welfare and reduce consumer welfare, but it generally is not illegal. 
Fowder (2010) suggests that this could be because a total welfare standard applies to price discrimination. See also 
Carlton and Heyer (2008). Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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the consumer vs. total welfare debate might be more productively framed in the regulatory con-
text.  
Should Utilities Handle EE? 
A final puzzle stems from the viewpoint that incumbent regulated monopoly utilities 
should be the conduit through which funds are raised to pay for EE programs and the institutions 
that should implement them. California’s manual for evaluating demand-side management pro-
grams (State of California 2002) proposes a number of tests in which the costs borne by utilities 
and the prices paid for the electricity they supply play a crucial role. Maryland’s plan to reduce 
electricity use 15 percent by 2015 obliges utilities to come up with programs to achieve the ―ma-
jority‖ of those savings (MEA 2008, 27) through a variety of EE subsidy programs involving 
equipment, loans, and audits of energy needs. Fox-Penner (2010, 189–202) envisions a ―new 
paradigm‖ of the ―Energy Services Utility,‖ in which the incumbents sell the uses to which ener-
gy is put (lighting, heating, and cooling) rather than the energy itself. This would allow the utility 
to capture the benefits of EE and provide an incentive consumers may lack, especially if they are 
either unable or unwilling to invest to capture the benefits of EE directly.  
The impetus to put utilities in the center of EE policy raises the question of whether doing 
so is a good idea. Utilities have spent a century or more engaged in supplying energy, not ―ener-
gy services.‖ In doing so, they have not been asked to encourage customers to buy less of what 
they have to sell (except on-peak, when prices have typically been below cost). To a considera-
ble degree, having utilities implement EE policy requires them to abandon their decades-long 
mission to supply energy. One may also wonder whether this is asking the electricity fox to 
guard the efficiency henhouse.  
Although the costs of changing business plans may be important, the economic policy 
puzzle here begins with the premise that, unlike the distribution of electricity to users, EE shows 
every indication of being a highly competitive enterprise. It seems almost stereotypically open to 
any number of entrepreneurial initiatives. There do not seem to be fixed costs—either in EE 
equipment or in EE-promoting programs—that preclude competition. This makes all the more 
compelling the question of why anyone should presume that a monopoly utility is the best pro-
vider of those programs. 
Separation of regulated monopolies from competitive lines of business has been a hall-
mark of utility policy for decades. In the 1970s, the Department of Justice led an effort to reform 
the regulation of oil pipelines by mandating that they be managed independently of shippers, Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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who could have an incentive to reduce a pipeline’s capacity and drive up the prices of products 
shipped through it (reviewed in Mitchell [1979]). The 1980s saw the antitrust case against 
AT&T, leading to the divestiture of its local telephone monopolies—likely the largest policy-
driven divestiture in U.S. history (Coll 1986). In the 1990s, the key event in opening wholesale 
electricity markets were FERC orders limiting the ability of competing generators to control the 
operation and to have differential access to information regarding monopoly electricity transmis-
sion grids (Brennan et al. 2002, Ch. 3).27  
The economic basis for separating the ownership of competitive business from the con-
trol of regulated monopolies begins with the idea that diversification into competitive businesses 
could be a tactic by which the monopoly could reap profits nominally thwarted by regulation. 
The undersizing argument regarding pipelines was that owners could set the pipeline’s output at 
the monopoly level and reap the profits through higher unregulated retail oil or petroleum prod-
uct prices. A second concern has been above-cost transfer pricing: if an unregulated upstream 
affiliate of a regulated firm sells its inputs at inflated prices, these prices then would be passed on 
as a cost to be covered through higher regulated rates.  
Two stories have dominated the discussion since the breakup of AT&T in the 1980s. The 
first, cross-subsidization, involves designating costs of providing unregulated service as costs of 
providing the regulated service. The effect of this is to raise regulated rates to cover these costs, 
reaping the profits in the cross-subsidized unregulated enterprise. This in turn can distort the un-
regulated market, displacing more efficient capacity at the margin and perhaps creating a credi-
ble predatory threat (Brennan 1990).  
More prominent in electricity policy is discrimination. A vertically integrated owner of a 
regulated service could use non-price methods of discrimination, such as providing lower-quality 
service or delayed access to the regulated service, against unaffiliated rivals in the unregulated 
market (Brennan 1987; Crew et al. 2004); other observers refer to this as ―sabotage‖ (Beard et al. 
2001). The prime example in electricity would be delayed construction, lower quality, or poorer 
maintenance of transmission lines that competing generation companies would use to sell their 
products in unregulated wholesale electricity markets. This tactic gives the regulated firm an arti-
ficial competitive advantage in the unregulated markets, through which it can attain profits based 
                                                 
27 The imposition of rules taking apart unified, vertically integrated utilities is why opening electricity markets and 
lifting regulation of wholesale (and in some states, retail) electricity prices is called restructuring.  Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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on its control of the ostensibly regulated monopoly transmission grid (Brennan et al. 2002, Ch. 
7). 
The policy puzzle is why policies that contradict these principles and history, vesting util-
ities with control over competitive EE provision, are so widespread. The answer may lie with an 
observation above regarding decoupling. Running EE policies through utilities allows legisla-
tures, particularly state legislatures constrained by the need to balance budgets, to avoid explicit 
taxation or cutting of other public services to pay for these programs. The ―tax‖ becomes an in-
crease in electricity rates granted to utilities to cover their costs of carrying out these services. If 
one believes that EE policy is desirable, channeling it through regulator commissions rather than 
adopting it through explicit legislation and taxation may be an acceptable tactic. A compromise 
to explore would be to use the regulatory process to have utilities collect funds to cover the cost 
of EE programs and then distribute the funds through an auction or other competitive process so 
entrepreneurial initiative is not stifled. As a side benefit, this would raise electricity prices that 
would otherwise be too low if EE policies are to be justified.28  
Summary 
Energy efficiency has become an increasingly important energy and infrastructure policy, 
especially as the best environmental policies, such as carbon taxes or cap-and-trade programs, 
become increasingly less likely. However, EE programs introduce a set of policy puzzles. Not 
only may greater EE increase energy use, but it also must do so if energy prices are sufficiently 
high, making the premise that EE substitutes for energy use an empirical question rather than a 
theoretical presumption. Combining EE with renewable energy standards can greatly increase the 
cost of the latter absent adjustments to the EE measurement baseline or using hypothetical rather 
than actual savings from EE deployment. Some may justify EE not with the premise that electric-
ity is too cheap because of unpriced environmental externalities, but with consumer choice fail-
ures. That raises a question of how to do cost–benefit analysis when the data on benefits, re-
vealed by willingness to pay, cannot be trusted if the policy requires that consumers be mistaken. 
Turning to institutional responses, decoupling of distribution utility revenues and profits 
from use may address some omissions in the analysis of the benefits of price caps over rate-of-
                                                 
28 Prices below cost may not be necessary to justify EE policies if consumers make erroneous choices regarding EE 
investments, as noted above. Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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return regulation, but the main justification appears to be to defuse utility opposition to EE poli-
cies. EE policy could be a way for regulators to ration and reduce demand in order to exercise 
monopsony power over electricity suppliers, suggesting that the debate about consumer vs. total 
welfare as the policy standard might be more pertinent to regulation than to the antitrust settings 
in which it has taken place. I ended by looking at having regulated utilities play a role in compet-
itive EE markets when doing so risks distorting the prices of both the regulated and unregulated 
products. The prominence of this role reinforces inferences from an analysis of decoupling and 
regulatory monopsony—that the politics allocating the responsibility of energy policy, and pay-
ing for it, between legislatures and regulators plays a role at least as great, if not greater, than any 
underlying analysis of market failures in electricity or energy.  
Appendices 
A. EE and Energy Use Are Complements at Sufficiently High Prices
29 
Let w(x, e) be the marginal willingness to pay for the x
th unit of electricity, with e units of EE 
in place. Neglecting income effects, the total value W(x, e) of that level of energy to a consumer 
is the area under the demand curve, 
  W(x, e) = W(0, e) +
x
dz ) e , z ( w
0
 .   
where W(0, e) is the value consumers get with e units of EE installed when no energy is used. 
Because EE increases the value the consumer gets from a given quantity of energy use, We(x, e) 
> 0:  
  Wx(x, e) = We(0, e) +   
x
e dz e , z w
0
> 0.    
Were the demand curve to fall everywhere, we(x, e) < 0 for all x. That would imply that the 
above expression is negative unless We(0, e) is sufficiently large; otherwise, there must be some 
                                                 
29 From Brennan (2011). Resources for the Future  Brennan 
23 
x° for which we(x°, e) > 0. Moreover, if wex < 0, that is, if the effect of EE on the marginal value 
of electricity falls with the amount of electricity consumed, there exists some x* for which we = 
0, we > 0 for x < x*, and we < 0 for x > x*, giving the ―pivot‖ in Figure 1.  
B. Incorporating EE into a Renewable Use Requirement 
First, leaving aside EE, let x be the amount of electricity produced and let r be the RPS 
percentage, so that rx units of electricity are produced with renewables. Let cr(.) be the cost of 
producing electricity with renewable sources, and let cf(.) be the cost of nonrenewables, 
designated here by an f for fossil fuels. The cost to the electricity sector of supplying x units of 
electricity, c(x), is thus 
  c(x) = cf([1 – r]x) + cr(rx). 
and the marginal cost c' of an additional kilowatt-hour of electricity is 
  c' = [1 – r]cf' + rcr' = cf' + r[cr' – cf']. 
Assuming that the RPS is binding, the marginal cost of renewable energy, cr' > cf'. The implicit 
tax imposed by the RPS is the difference between the actual marginal cost c' and the marginal 
cost were only fossil fuels used, cf', r[cr' – cf']. 
Suppose energy use reductions can be used to satisfy an RPS. Let b be the baseline from 
which energy reductions will be calculated. For a given quantity x of electricity supplied, the 
amount of renewable-source electricity required will be rx – [b – x] or [1 + r]x – b, where rx is 
the nominal renewable requirement and b – x is the energy savings relative to the baseline that 
can be applied toward meeting the RPS. The remaining amount of electricity, x – [rx – [b – x]] = 
b – rx, would be produced using nonrenewable sources. The cost of supplying x units of elec-
tricity becomes 
  c(x) = cf(b – rx) + cr([1 + r]x – b). 
with marginal cost 
c' = -rcf' + [1 + r]cr' = cf' + [1 + r][cr' – cf']. Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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With EE incorporated into an RPS, the implicit tax on fossil fuel-generated electricity jumps 
from r[cr' – cf'] to [1 + r][cr' – cf']. 
C. Utility Disincentives to Provide Demand-Reducing Information or to Subsidize 
Substitutes
30  
Assume that a regulated distribution utility with fixed costs chooses information I to 
maximize profits net of those costs under a capped energy price px 
   pxx(px, I) – h(I). 
The profit-maximizing level of information meets the condition 
  pxxI = h'. 
Because h' > 0, xI > 0. The utility will provide only information that boosts demand. 
However, distribution utilities typically buy electricity at cost c(x) and sell at retail, giving profits 
(net of fixed costs) as  
  pxx(px, I) – c(x(px, I)) – h(I). 
The profit-maximizing level of information satisfies 
  [px – c']xI = h'. 
If prices exceed marginal cost, then the above result applies—the utility will supply only 
information that boosts demand. However, if the electricity price is set under conventional 
practice where prices are an average of low off-peak marginal costs and very high on-peak costs, 
then it will be sold at prices below marginal cost during peak periods, implying that the utility 
will want to supply information that reduces demand.  
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Similar results hold for when a distribution utility would subsidize complements (which 
increase demand) or substitutes (which reduce it). 
D. Enhanced Effect of EE in a Decoupled Utility 
Under decoupling, distribution revenues R are held constant. Let x is electricity use and p is 
its price, where p = pw + pd, and e the amount of EE employed, where pw is the wholesale price 
of electricity and pd is the price of distribution. For simplicity, we assume that the individual 
utility’s actions regarding e have no effect on pw.  With decoupling,  
  pdx(pw + pd, e) = R. 
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making the total effect of EE on energy use 





























where ε = pxp/x is the elasticity of demand for electricity.  If |ε| < p/pd, the denominator on the 
right will be positive but less than one, implying that |dx/de| > |xe|.  If xe is negative, that is, more 
energy efficiency reduces energy use, the total reduction in energy use from of increasing energy 
efficiency on energy use will exceed the direct reduction because of the consequent increase in 
pd.  If the rebound effect dominates because the price of electricity is high—see Appendix A—
decoupling will similarly enhance that positive effect on energy use because pd will fall. Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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E. Regulatory Incentives To Monopsonize through Subsidizing EE
31  
Assume that the regulator is choosing the quantity of electricity, x, and the amount of EE, e, 
to maximize consumer welfare less the cost of EE, h(e), subject to a constraint that energy price 
equals marginal cost. 
  W(x, e, ) =              x ' c e , x w e h x e , x w dz e , z w
x
     
0
 .   
The first-order condition for electricity, x, is 
  [wx(x, e) – c"(x)] = wx(x, e)x. 
which implies 
   
   
.
x " c e , x w





   
Because wx is negative, c" is nonnegative  ≤ x, with the equality holding only if c" = 0, implying 
perfectly elastic electricity supply.  
The first-order condition for EE, e, is 
             
x
e e x e , x w e ' h dz e , z w
0
. 
The left-hand side is the marginal value to consumers of EE—that is, its price—less h', the 
marginal cost of EE. If EE reduces use, we(x, e) < 0. Because x >  unless supply is perfectly 
elastic, the right-hand side is negative, implying a monopsonistic incentive to set the price of EE 
below its marginal cost. 
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